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Abstract
This paper is a reminder of the danger of allowing \risk" when synchronizing a parallel
discrete-event simulation: a simulation code that runs correctly on a serial machine may, when
run in parallel, fail catastrophically. This can happen when Time Warp presents an \inconsis-
tent" message to an LP, a message that makes absolutely no sense given the LP's state. Failure
may result if the simulation modeler did not anticipate the possibility of this inconsistency.
While the problem is not new, there has been little discussion of how to deal with it; further-
more the problem may not be evident to new users or potential users of parallel simulation. This
paper shows how the problem may occur, and the damage it may cause. We show how one may
eliminate inconsistencies due to lagging rollbacks and stale state, but then show that so long
as risk is allowed it is still possible for an LP to be placed in a state that is inconsistent with
model semantics, again making it vulnerable to failure. We nally show how simulation code
can be tested to ensure safe execution under a risk-free protocol. Whether risky or risk-free,
we conclude that under current practice the development of correct and safe parallel simulation
code is not transparent to the modeler; certain protections must be included in model code or
model testing that are not rigorously necessary if the simulation were executed only serially.

This work was supported in part by by NSF grants CCR-9308667 and CCR-9625894, and DARPA Contract
N66001-96-C-8530.
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Figure 1: Hierarchy of software layers in typical parallel simulation discrete-event simulation
(PDES) package
1 Introduction
Reynolds has argued that synchronization protocols for parallel discrete-event simulation are char-
acterized by a spectrum of attributes [10]. In particular, he noted that protocols broadly categorized
as \optimistic" really entail two dierent aspects; aggressiveness means executing an event before
it is certain to be correct to do so, and risk means sending a message that might not be correct.
That the two ideas could be separated was demonstrated by Reynolds with a variant on his SRADS
protocol [4] the distinction was also used by Steinman in development of the SPEEDES system
using the Breathing Time Buckets protocol [12]. Both methods employ aggressiveness, but not
risk.
The most widely cited optimistic systems use risk, notably the Time Warp Operating System
(TWOS) [6] and Georgia Time Warp (GTW) [3]. The TWOS eort ended some years ago; GTW
typies Time Warp simulators in current use. GTW is essentially a library whose classes and
methods can be used in a C or C++ program to transform it into a simulation. One can think of
a GTW simulation as code in some high level programming language that calls the GTW libraries,
which use Unix facilities. Figure 1 illustrates this layering in the general case. Regions where some
state-saving occurs are highlighted.
Optimistic methods are able to recover from temporal errors by saving enough \state" to return
them to a prior simulation time. The modeler is responsible for identifying state variables in user
code; the Time Warp state is comprised of these variables and some internal state information.
Much of the operating environment in which an optimistic simulation executes is not considered
to be state, and is not saved or restored. The signicance of this fact cannot be overstated. The
trend in parallel simulators is to link together simulation libraries, user model code, and user code
libraries. The user code libraries in particular may not have been developed for use with optimistic
parallel simulation in mind. A case in point is the TeD simulation language being developed at
Georgia Tech for the simulation of telecommunication networks; TeD resides astride GTW [1]. Very
explicit mechanisms are provided in that tool to link to potentially large blocks of ordinary C/C++
code; the language by design is a \meta-language" that allows certain simulation constructs to be
embedded in a high level language. The problem we consider is that under normal Time Warp
operating rules, user model code and user libraries may be executed using data arguments that are
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utterly inconsistent with the logical state of the code. We will see that the consequences may be
that the program crashes (at best), or leads to incorrect behavior or results without hint of error
(at worst).
These disturbing consequences are made possible because by accepting risk, Time Warp allows
a logical process (LP) to execute a message that is inconsistent with the state of the LP (throughout
the paper we will say that the message is inconsistent, although the fault of the inconsistency may
actually lie with the LP). Such a message is destined to be canceled (or the LP is destined to be
rolled back), but the LP has no way of knowing this. Processing the message, the state of the
LP is combined with the data in the message to produce potentially nonsensical data and actions
that have the ability to corrupt the operating environment in a way that will not be xed by any
rollback. Under the normal Time Warp execution rules there is no way, in general, for the LP to
automatically recognize that the message is inconsistent with the LP state.
The dark side of risk, what your mother never told you about Time Warp, is that every general
purpose Time Warp system running today has the potential to behave in this way. So
long as a Time Warp system allows a modeler to include completely general code with the ability to
write into non-checkpointed areas such as user library space or runtime system space, that system
has an accident waiting to happen.
We have not come to bury Time Warp, but to praise it
1
. For a very important set of real
simulation problems, it oers the only hope of high-delity parallel simulation. The reason we
are emphasizing this particular aspect of Time Warp based simulation is that parallel simulation
technology has matured to the point where major complex systems are being proposed that will
use it. The complexity of these systems is such that verication and validation just assuming
serial execution is a major exercise in software engineering. Our point is that engineering of
parallel simulations additionally requires one to ensure the safety of the simulation in all states in
which it might be placed. We do not believe it is widely understood that this is a larger and more
dicult problem for optimistic parallel simulation than it is for serial or conservatively synchronized
simulation. But it most certainly is, because the space of potential code states is much larger, and
may include states that defy the model semantics or physical constraints of the modeled system.
The threat of this behavior was foreseen by the TWOS designers, and their solution is noteworthy
2
.
They recognized that a possible consequence of processing an inconsistent message would be to en-
gage in an action causing a runtime error, e.g., pass a negative value to a square root function,
suer a segmentation fault by indexing outside of array bounds, divide by zero, generate an arith-
metic underow or overow, etc. . The TWOS system caught Unix signals generated by these
occurrences and placed the faulting LP in an \error" state, from which it could be released by a
rollback. An error was reported to the user only if the error state was committed, e.g., the GVT
passed its time-stamp. This solution goes part way, but is not complete, at least in environments
similar to Figure 1. By processing an inconsistent message, an LP can damage the heap, stack, or
1
Julius Caesar, III.ii, with apologies to Mark Antony.
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static data area, without generating a signal. The damage may not aect execution until long after
its occurrence, and in any case, is permanent.
TWOS was implemented on four platforms (Mark II Hypercube, Mark III Hypercube, BBN
Buttery, UNIX network), the last three t the model of Figure 1. Interestingly, in the Mark II
Hypercube, TWOS was the fundamental operating system and so was better able to protect itself
against erratic LP behavior. In all versions dynamic memory management was a touchy issue, so
touchy in fact that TWOS programmers were advised to eschew pointers altogether. While the
Mark II Hypercube version monitored stack usage (blowing the stack while executing an inconsistent
message was a regular occurrence|remember that the Mark II had only 256K memory/node), the
later versions did not. The threat of innite loops was not addressed, although it was thought that
this could be handled if a message arrival triggered an interrupt that was permitted to halt the
LP's processing of an event. To our knowledge, GTW does not lter Unix signals nor does it oer
protection against any of these possibilities.
This paper rst illustrates concretely how this problem can arise and discusses its ramications,
providing a review of a problem long known to Time Warp cognoscente. Our contribution is to
explore how to eliminate two sources of the problem|lagging rollbacks and stale state|and then to
show that an LP can still be pushed into a state that is inconsistent with model semantics. We look
at risk-free protocols, and show that if all LP code is safe with respect to \internal speculation",
then the simulation is safe. Finally, we comment on the ramication of these observations on
parallel simulator and on user code.
2 The Problem
We encountered the possibility of processing an inconsistent message when using GTW to simulate
multicast resource allocation algorithms. In our model, a \link" LP is responsible for storing
the current usage and availability of a network link. Such an LP may be queried \how much
bandwidth do you have available", may be instructed \give me B bits per second bandwidth",
and may be notied \I'm returning B bits per second bandwidth". \Node" LPs simulate the
arrival of multicast requests; the multicast acceptance procedure involves (i) querying the link LPs
that would be involved in the broadcast, analyzing the available bandwidth and (if the broadcast
can be accepted) (ii) computing how much bandwidth should be requested from each link, (iii)
instructing each link to allocate this computed amount to the broadcast. When the broadcast
session is completed, the node LP restores the used bandwidth to the link LPs involved in the
broadcast.
This paper resulted from our observation that link LPs with zero available bandwidth were
sometimes instructed to allocate some non-zero amount of bandwidth to a new connection, and that
link LPs whose bandwidth was completely available were sometimes instructed to add additional
available bandwidth.
Close analysis revealed that these nonsensical situations were transient, either the LP was rolled
back and when approaching the message again was in a state consistent with the message's instruc-
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Figure 2: Timing diagram of how an inconsistent message may occur.
tion, or the message itself was annihilated. We also came to understand how these situations could
arise. Figure 2 illustrates an example. At (simulation) time 100 a link LP would be queried by
node 1 for availability information, and would report its available bandwidth, B > 0, in response.
Then, the link LP is rolled back to an earlier time, say 90, by a message from node 2 that claims all
B bits per second of the available bandwidth at time 90. Node 2 does not release this bandwidth
any time soon. As part of the processing of that rollback, an anti-message is sent after the response
message to node 1, but is recognized only after node 1 uses the rst response in a decision to claim
bandwidth C bits per second bandwidth from the link LP, before the anti-message catches up with
it (N.B., our understanding of GTW is that event processing routines are atomic, meaning that
so long as the anti-message arrives after the initiation of the event that generates the bandwidth
claim message, that erroneous message will be sent). Node 1's bandwidth claim is destined to be
annihilated, because node 1 is destined to be rolled back to deal with the link LP's new (empty)
state. But, the link LP processes the bandwidth claim from a state where no bandwidth is avail-
able. Of course, eventually the link LP will be rolled back when the bandwidth claim message is
annihilated.
So why should we be concerned if an LP processes a funny looking message, since that will all
get sorted out with rollbacks? We ought to be concerned because the code processing that message
may not have been designed to deal with anomalous messages. We ought to be concerned because
by combining the state of the message with the state of the LP it is conceivable that the LP code
will do any one of a number of bad things, including
 indexing outside of array bounds to damage memory or cause a segmentation fault,
 call a recursive function with arguments that do not yield a \bottom" to the recursion,
 enter an innite loop,
 commit some numerical error such as divide-by-zero, (under/over)-ow, negative arguments
to an library routine expecting positive arguments,
 delete an object from an empty data structure,
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 just about any bone-headed error you've ever done or ever seen done in a C or C++ program.
The point should be clear, the danger of processing an inconsistent message is that the code devel-
oper has a certain model of system behavior in mind that derives from physical reality. Processing
of an inconsistent message can push the LP into an unforeseen state that does not correspond to
physical reality. While the code may be safe and correct in all states corresponding to physical
reality (the only states in which it will nd itself in a correct serial simulation or a conservatively
synchronized parallel simulation), it might not be safe in non-physical states. As it processes an
inconsistent message it may behave in unforeseen ways, damaging memory in the runtime system
or even in the parallel simulation libraries. Damaged memory that is not considered to be part of
the Time Warp \state" is damaged forever, and has the potential to crash the simulation, alter the
behavior of the simulation, or corrupt some data associated with the simulation.
3 Safety through Methodology
Once we understood the source of the problem we saw that we could try to detect when a message
was inconsistent and not act upon it, or just allow inconsistent messages to make the LP link state
nonsensical and try to prevent the simulator from damaging the runtime environment. We now
explore these options. Both solution approaches rely on the LP code doing checking that may
detect that the LP should be suspended until rolled back to an earlier time. We presume then that
the Time Warp system includes a call to implement self-suspension.
To require that a code check the logical consistency of each message it processes is philosoph-
ically unsettling. We all learned at our mothers' knees that Time Warp is supposed to make
synchronization transparent to the user, it most denitely is not transparent if in order to en-
sure that it runs without crashing we must augment the code with extensive consistency checks.
Granted, good software engineering practice calls for extensive checks; all you who routinely write
code this way, please raise your hand. Hmm, I thought not. In any case, it may be technically
dicult or even impossible to always determine whether a message is consistent. Asynchronous
code is hard enough to develop correctly when one knows what the correct messages look like, let
alone having to anticipate and protect against the potential of arbitrarily inconsistent messages.
The second approach would include the TWOS signal trapping trick, but would also try to
detect problems before they occur. Arguments for all library functions would have to be tested
for reasonableness, to avoid things like taking the logarithm of a negative number. Nearly every
memory access has to be tested for reasonableness, even if pointers are banned. Every single read
or write to an array must rst check that the index is within the array bounds. This holds true
even if the array is declared to be simulation \state"|its memory space is in the heap somewhere
and stepping outside of its connes can cause damage. But it gets worse. Some array writes are
done tacitly, using C/C++ library calls. One can imagine a string being created using sprintf but
for that string to exceed the allocated space because the string contents depend on an inconsistent
message. The ability for detecting memory access problems has gotten quite comprehensive, it is
conceivable that most such problems could be caught using the sort of technology behind commercial
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tools like Purify [11] and insure++ [2]. To develop that technology independently for a parallel
simulation engine is a daunting task.
A \catch-it-in-the-act" approach will also have to deal with bottomless recursion and innite
loops. There is a serious theoretical problem here, in that the well-known halting problem asserts
that there is no algorithm that can take an arbitrary loop and detect whether it terminates. Pro-
tection from innite looping has to be ad-hoc. To be completely safe one would have to be able
to detect when processing of a message could lead to an innite loop or bottomless recursion, and
this is denitely non-trivial.
In summary, to rely on user-supplied consistency checking alone to lter out inconsistent mes-
sages is to court disaster. On the other hand, the implementation cost of monitoring executing
C/C++ code to protect the runtime system from all possible ways of being trashed is overwhelming.
In either case, substantially more work is involved to ensure that the parallel simulation runs safely
than is required for a serial or conservatively synchronized simulation. It is clearly not enough to
test a parallel simulation on one processor and expect it to always run safely in parallel.
The only hope for a comprehensive solution is to ensure that each LP's code is run in isolation
and cannot damage the environment. At no time can the code be left to run on its own until
\completion", because \completion" may never come. These are actually the same issues behind
running Java [5] applets safely; a truly comprehensive solution might be based on using Java to
express and execute LP code, or use some other interpreted language. In the meantime, what can
we do with the C/C++ based Time Warp systems?
4 Rollback Consistency and Stale States
A rst step towards dealing with the consistency problem is to dene our terms. The root cause of
the problem in the multicast simulation was that a rollback or cancelation process occurred, but
the LP reected the post- (alternatively, pre-) rollback system state and the message reected the
pre- (alternatively, post-) rollback system state. This leads us to dene rollback consistency.
One can think of Time Warp's execution on an LP as dening a tree, branches occurring where
rollbacks are induced. Each rollback creates a new arm that is followed, until a rollback splits it.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 where a sequence of four time-lines shows the evolution of this tree.
The extent of each arm denotes the distance in simulation time the LP advanced before being rolled
back. The solid line denotes the current state evolution path, dotted lines denote \dead" paths.
Labeled black boxes identify points where the LP generated a message; arrows identify points in
simulation time where the LP is rolled back. A circle marks the branch in the tree caused by a
rollback, and is labeled with the simulation time of the rollback.
One can imagine sampling the state of the LP at dierent points in execution time, each sample
would map to the end of the currently \active" execution arm; e.g., one could sample the state at
the point message A is sent, and again at the point message B is sent. At the instant the state was
sampled, the active tree arm would be at the label A in the rst case, and B in the second case.
The execution tree gives us a way of reasoning about the consistency of LP state sampled at two
6
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Figure 3: The evolution of an execution tree
dierent points in simulation (and real) time. We'll say that two samples are rollback consistent
if they lie on a common path (including branches) in the execution tree. Samples associated with
messages C and D are consistent (even after the rollback at time 11), as are samples associated with
messages C and E. No other pair of labeled points are consistent. Given two consistent samples,
we can order them by simulation time.
Next we think about how an LP's state evolves as a function of the states of other LPs at
various points in simulation time. Conceptually, at any instant we could describe how the state
of LP i has been inuenced by all other LPs, in terms of the data state of all other LPs at the
various last (in real time) times they aected LP i. We can track these dependencies, as follows.
Associate with each LP i a dependency vector (DV) that contains a component for every LP. The
j
th
component holds a code describing the last state of LP j to aect LP i. Initially the DV has
null components, save for the LP's own component; the DV is updated when an ordinary message
is accepted, to reect the new inuences on the LP's state (anti-messages are excluded from this
discussion). This is accomplished by associating with every message the sender's DV at the time
of transmission. As the message is processed we update the recipient's DV by merging it with the
message's DV. For each component we save the most \up-to-date" of the two. This way of thinking
about dependency is basically Lamport's idea of distributed clocks [7].
Within this conceptual framework we can identify situations where inconsistencies arise. If for
any component j the recipient's code for j is rollback-inconsistent with the message's component
for j, then we know that LP j underwent a rollback that aected and is reected in the state of
either the sender or receiver, but not both. Returning to the time-line of Figure 2, we see that
at the point that the link LP accepts the inconsistent message, the state of the link LP reects
the time 90 rollback, but that the link component for the message's DV does not reect it. The
link state component of the recipient is rollback-inconsistent with the link state component of the
message.
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Figure 4: Inconsistency due to stale state.
A concrete example of a state code that detects rollback-inconsistency is a certain type of list.
The rst list element gives the simulation time of the sampled state. Following this is an ordered
list of simulation times at which the LP was rolled back prior to sampling the state. Rollback
times appear in this list in the order that the rollbacks were applied. For example, in Figure 3
the code for the LP state when message E is sent is the send-time of that message, followed by
(9; 7; 11). Let (t
1
; L
1
) and (t
2
; L
2
) two codes for an LP, where t
1
and t
2
are simulation times and
L
1
and L
2
are ordered lists of rollback times. If these lists have dierent lengths, then the shorter
list is necessarily a proper prex of the longer, e.g., (without loss of generality) L
1
= (L
2
; L
0
1
). If
there is any rollback time in L
0
1
that is less than t
2
, the codes are rollback-inconsistent. (t
1
; L
1
) was
sampled later in real-time than was (t
2
; L
2
), and reects a rollback that brought the LP behind the
simulation time of (t
2
; L
2
)'s sample. If instead there is no rollback in L
0
1
with a time-stamp less
than t
2
, then the additional rollbacks reected in L
1
happen too late in simulation time to aect
the sample at (t
2
; L
2
), and so the codes are rollback-consistent.
However, there is another source of inconsistency, due instead to what we'll call \stale states".
An simple 3 LP example illustrates this possibility. A time-line for the scenario is given in Figure 4.
There is a resource that at any point in simulation time is held by either LP 1 or LP 2. The resource
is held by an LP until the other requests it, and some random time after the request, the resource
is released to the LP requesting it. Now imagine that at time 100 LP 2 has the resource and LP
1 requests it. LP 1 does not know when it will actually acquire the resource, and so continues
optimistically on to an event at time 120, under the assumption that it does not have the resource
at time 120. The event processed at time 120 responds to a query by LP 3, \Do you have the
resource now?". Assuming not, LP 1 replies \No" at time 121. Sometime after this exchange LP
2 decides to yield the resource, at simulation time 110. Immediately after sending the \It's yours
now" message to LP 1, it processes a query event from LP 3 at simulation time 121. \No", it replies.
Upon receipt of this second negative response, LP 3 is in an illogical (with respect to the model
semantics) state. We cannot pin this situation on a rollback inconsistency, because no rollbacks
have yet occurred.
The problem in this case is that LP 3's state is \stale" with respect to the query response
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message it receives from LP 2. It is stale in the sense that some action has been initiated that
ultimately will roll LP 3 back, that the LP 2 data dependency component of LP 2's message to
LP 3 is of a state that follows that initiation, but the LP 2 component of LP 3's data dependency
vector will be aected by that initiation, but has not yet been aected by it.
More formally, if M is a message processed by LP j, we'll say that LP j's state is stale with
respect to M if M 's dependency vector component for some LP k reects a state of LP k that
follows its transmission of a message that initiates a rollback, the penultimate result of which is to
rollback LP j, but which result has not yet occurred. The denition of M being stale with respect
to LP j's state is entirely similar, save that the penultimate result is that M is annihilated.
Rollback-inconsistency and stale state are related concepts in that rollback inconsistency occurs
when a completed rollback makes two sampled states inconsistent, whereas stale state occurs when
an initiated but as yet uncompleted rollback chain makes two sampled states inconsistent. For
example, whereas states associated with C and D in Figure 3 are rollback consistent, once the rst
message responsible for initiating the rollback chain that causes the rollback at time 11 is sent,
state D becomes stale, even before the time 11 rollback is recognized.
The problems of rollback inconsistency and stale state can be both eliminated by the simple
mechanism of requiring message acknowledgments. The discussion below assumes the use of ag-
gressive cancelation (also a modied lazy cancelation is possible so long as before a rolled back
LP sends any new post-rollback message, all previously sent messages with larger time-stamps are
aggressively canceled, with acknowledgments all received).
When an LP sends an ordinary message, it blocks from further processing until it receives
an acknowledgment for that message (actually, all that is required is that it not send any new
message before that acknowledgment is received). If a message (ordinary or anti-) is placed in LP
j's input buer and does not cause rollback, that message is acknowledged immediately. If instead
the message triggers a rollback, say at simulation time t, LP j does not acknowledge the message
until it has itself received an acknowledgment for all anti-messages sent with time-stamps greater
than t.
We must argue that this mechanism does not cause deadlock, and that it does indeed eliminate
rollback inconsistency and stale data.
Theorem 1 Under message acknowledgments for anti-messages, and for ordinary messages, the
system does not deadlock.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction suppose the system is deadlocked. Among all blocked LPs,
consider the source LP of the unacknowledged message with largest receive-time. We may assume
that message is not in transit. Since the target has not acknowledged it, the message must have
triggered a rollback that generated anti-messages, acknowledgments for which the target is still
awaiting. But no such messages exist, because the target received the unacknowledged message
with largest time-stamp. This establishes the contradiction and completes the proof.
2
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The proof above does not depend on the type of message awaiting an acknowledgement, and so
holds whether we acknowledge only anti-messages or all messages.
Theorem 2 Under message acknowledgments for anti-messages, rollback-inconsistency is elimi-
nated.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction, suppose a message M is delivered to LP k such that the
message's dependency vector is rollback-inconsistent with LP k's dependency vector in component
j. Without loss of generality (and using the list code described earlier), suppose that LP k's DV
code for LP j, (t
1
; L
1
), is a later (with respect to wallclock time) reection of LP j's state than is the
corresponding component (t
2
; L
2
) in M 's DV. Rollback-inconsistency implies that L
1
= (L
2
; L
0
1
)
for some non-empty list L
0
1
, and that L
0
1
contains some rollback time t
3
with t
3
< t
2
. We take t
3
to
be the rst such rollback time in L
0
1
. Ultimately we can trace back the appearance of code (t
2
; L
2
)
in M 's DV to a transmission at time t
2
by LP j. When LP j processes the rollback at t
3
after that
transmission, it does not send any further messages before receiving an acknowledgment for the
anti-message it sends to cancel the time t
2
message. That anti-message, possibly triggering other
anti-messages that must be acknowledged, erases all dependence of any LP on the state of LP j
reported in the time t
2
message. LP j cannot advance to any state represented by code (t
1
; L
1
)
before that cancelation is complete. Hence, code (t
2
; L
2
) may not be associated with M if LP k's
code is (t
1
; L
1
), establishing the contradiction and proving the theorem.
2
It is worth noting that a measure of safety can be gained just by acknowledging anti-messages.
Additionally requiring acknowledgments for ordinary messages brings freedom from stale states as
well.
Theorem 3 Under message acknowledgments for ordinary and anti-messages, the system is free
from stale states.
Proof: Suppose that LP k's state is stale with respect to message M in the dependency vector
component for LP j. This means that LP j sent some message M
0
before achieving the state re-
ected in M 's DV component for LP j, a message that triggers a rollback chain that will ultimately
aect LP j, but has not. This cannot occur, as LP j awaits an acknowledgment forM
0
before send-
ing any further messages. A similar argument shows that M cannot be stale with respect to LP
j's state.
2
Two important points should be noted here. First, Time Warp pioneers recognized that if the
system contained messages that would cause an LP to rollback and messages that would cause it to
move forward, then the rollback should have precedence. This could be done heuristically by always
processing anti-messages before other messages. Some schemes even proposed preemptive rollbacks
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of all LPs within some \distance" of a temporal error without bothering to see if anti-messages
would indeed trigger rollbacks there [9]. Our acknowledgments are the logical extension of such
thinking. Second, waiting for acknowledgments before allowing an LP to send another message
need not impact performance greatly. This is a matter of latency hiding. If there are many LPs
on each processor, then after suspending one we may well be able to nd many that have useful
work to perform while the rst is blocked. In any case, the requirement is that an LP not send
another message without appropriate acknowledgments, not that it cannot process. It is viable to
allow the LP to continue executing, and buer its messages until appropriate acknowledge releases
are obtained.
However, it again is not dicult to see that even without rollback inconsistencies or stale state
that an LP can be driven into a state that is at odds with actual model semantics. Consider now a
three LP simulation of a control loop. LP 1 increments an 8-bit counter every d units of simulation.
LP 3 can send LP 1 a message to adjust the inter-increment spacing d to some new value; LP 1
sends LP 3 a message whenever its counter crosses from value 63 to 64. LP 2 sends LP 1 a message,
at random epochs, to clear the counter. Figure 5 illustrates the system. Control in this system
is provided by LP 3. The logic of the underlying physical system is that the LP 1 counter never
overows, and that here are upper and lower bounds on the value of d that LP 3 may choose for
LP 1. If for some reason LP 2 were to be slowed down in its execution, LP 1 can increment the
counter to overowing, and as a result provide non-physical behavior statistics to LP 3, in such a
way that the constraints of the underlying control law are violated.
There are actually two sources of trouble in this example. One is that LP 1 sends risky messages
to LP 3, befouling LP 3's internal state. The other is that LP 1 proceeds aggressively beyond its
own physical parameters, to overow the counter. In the next section we examine the benets of
eliminating the rst trouble source, and look at how to live with the second.
5 Safety and Risk-Free Protocols
In our view, the real danger of allowing risky messages is that in a complex code the space of
possible nonsense states into which an LP might be driven is too large to anticipate. Intuition will
guide a model developer so long as the LP data state can be assumed to reect a real possible state
in the modeled physical system. Even though banning risk still allows one to get into states that
are inconsistent with model semantics, we argue that if the model code is safe under all \internally
speculative" scenarios, then it is safe under a risk-free protocol.
Reconsider the control loop example from the last section, and imagine that it is simulated
with a risk-free synchronization protocol. LP 1 may simulate accurately through some S units of
simulation time that contains \increment" events, and risk-free \clear counter" events. But, to
process beyond this interval is to process aggressively; it may do so without receipt of any \clear-
counter" messages from LP 2 through enough simulation time to cause the counter to overow.
Under a risk-free protocol, LP 1 will withhold all messages it might generate for LP 3 until it
can be certain that those messages are correct. So, while in this example LP 1 may wander into
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LP 1
incr @ d units
simulation time
LP 2
Wait random time,
send clear msg
counter > 63
Clear counter
adjust d spacing
LP 3
adjust d
Figure 5: Control loop example illustrating that an LP may be driven into a non-physical state
even in the absence of rollback inconsistencies and stale state.
non-physical states due to its own aggressive processing, LP 3 is not aected by the result of LP
1's aggression.
While inconsistency is still possible in LP 1, there is a critical dierence, that the inconsistency
derives solely from actions that are dened internally by LP 1. This constraint vastly simplies the
programmer's job in verifying the safety of the program. For, let S denote the set of \real" LP data
states, those corresponding to physical reality. During testing and verication of correctness, one
ensures that the transitions between states in S is correct in response to a set of external messages
M
E
and in response to a set of internal messages M
I
. If a risk-free protocol is used, to test or
verify safety, one needs only to ensure that the LP is safe within all states S
0
 S, obtained by
considering all ways of starting with a state in S and repeatedly making transitions by accepting
messages fromM
I
. Contrast this with the need to test or verify the set of states S
00
 S
0
, obtained
by considering all ways of starting with a state in S and repeatedly making transitions driven by
messages of any kind or content. In the former case it is reasonable to expect the code developer to
have intuition about the behavior of the LP code in S
0
, in the latter case it is a much harder job.
6 Ramications
If one is to take our warnings seriously, what are the ramications for doing optimistic parallel
discrete-event simulation within a Unix C/C++ environment ? There are ramications for the
simulator, and ramications for user code, issues we treat separately.
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6.1 Ramications for Parallel Simulator
Accepting the premise that complete protection from inconsistency and its consequences cannot
be provided automatically, we will rely on the user to provide error checking. To support this
the simulator should provide a procedure call, say, SuspendLP(int LPid, char* ErrMsg), to
suspend an LP from further processing until it is rolled back. An error message provided with that
call as an argument is printed if the GVT advances past the LP's simulation time when suspended.
Careful users may embed consistency checks within their code and call SuspendLP upon evidence
of logical inconsistency.
The simulator should protect itself against UNIX error signals, as did TWOS. This is accom-
plished simply by (i) having the simulator call the Unix function signal for each of the error signals
to trap, informing Unix of the signal trap to call upon its occurrence; (ii) having the simulator call
the Unix setjmp function once within the scheduler to save a snapshot of the process context, (iii)
handle trapped errors by calling SuspendLP, and return control to the scheduler loop using the
Unix longjmp function.
With eort, some protection against a blown stack may be provided if the simulator includes
a call allowing the user to specify a maximum user code call stack depth (in number of calls)
and/or maximum stack depth (in number of bytes). That's the easy part. The harder part is to
write code that modies the user code binary, checking the stack for consistency with these declared
constraints. This might be done using a tool such as EEL [8], which can be taught how to recognize
object code that is setting up a procedure call, and can then insert additional consistency checking
code. Such a solution is highly dependent on the underlying hardware.
The simulator ought to provide an option for risk-free operation.
A C++-based simulator should provide base classes for array types that throw exceptions when
an access is attempted that falls outside of the array bounds. The exception handler should call
SuspendLP.
The simulator may provide a nal measure of insurance by eliminating rollback-inconsistencies,
and stale states as we have described. Despite all these precautions, participation by the user is
required, described next.
6.2 Ramications for User Code
While the parallel simulator can catch some problems resulting from inconsistencies, it cannot catch
all of them. The user has to be responsible for ensuring that no memory write is harmful, and that
control is not lost to an innite loop or bottomless recursion. The user's burden is very large; in
C/C++ there are a multitude of ways to trash memory. Every one has to be anticipated and tested
for. Equally weighty is the responsibility to detect when control is lost to an innite loop or endless
recursion. All we can do is provide the simulator with the features described earlier, and provide
the user with strong remonstrations to do consistency checking and use those features, especially
with regards to memory referencing, loops, and calling behavior.
Until LP code is run in isolation, the only complete way to be assured that inconsistent pro-
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cessing does not harm the simulation is to prove this, formally. Failing that, we can only trust to
providence that the simulation is safe and is behaving as it should. While this sounds bleak, in
truth, even after extensive testing and debugging only providence is trusted for ordinary complex
software systems that control nuclear power plants, y airplanes, and route trains.
7 Conclusions
We remind the community that optimistic processing implies that LPs may be temporarily driven
into nonintuitive states. We point out that with current trends in using C and C++ as the basis
for parallel simulation, this creates a danger of damaging the simulation while it executes in one of
these states, for the executing code has access to portions of the stack, heap, and static data areas
that are not checkpointed.
Our concern is that parallel simulation is on the threshold of being used to build large complex
models, but that the safety ramications of optimistic processing in general, and risky messages
in particular are not well understood by those who would build those simulators. For, the model
code has to be resilient enough not to crash the system, even when pushed into transient, but
unexpected non-physical non-intuitive states.
We argue that the only comprehensive solution is to isolate an LP's execution from everything
else, which could be accomplished by interpreting LP code rather than executing it; however, this
solution is not realistic for current C/C++ based simulators and so we consider what might be
done for them.
We observe that lagging rollbacks and stale states are two important causes of an LP entering
a nonsense state, and show that requiring acknowledgments from anti-messages eliminates lagging
rollbacks, and that additionally requiring acknowledgments from ordinary messages eliminates stale
states. We then observe that the possibility for an LP to enter a nonsense state remains.
We note that the problem of verifying an LP code's safety is much reduced if it can be assumed
that a risk-free synchronization protocol will be used. The programmer needs only consider the
eects of speculative computation that are entirely internal to the LP. This eliminates the need
to anticipate against processing arbitrarily illogical messages. Finally, we summarize with a list of
ramications our warnings may have on parallel simulators and parallel simulation user code.
Optimistic synchronization provides the only way some important problem classes can be sim-
ulated with delity on parallel machines. However, it is important to realize that the software
engineering burden of using Time Warp is higher than for serial simulation. So long as the LP code
can adversely aect its operating environment, synchronization concerns are not transparent to
the modeler. There are some things that can be done automatically to reduce the threat, but they
do not come for free. The acknowledgments we propose may impact performance, but will reduce
the number of ways of triggering an inadvertent crash. Use of a risk-free protocol may impact
performance, but may make it feasible to have condence that the simulation will run safely in
parallel. These are tradeos that have to be considered, and which have not been emphasized until
now.
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